



# Monetary Analysis: Price and Financial Stability

Markus K. Brunnermeier and Yuliy Sannikov  
Princeton University

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# ||| The 3 main points

## 1. Monetary analysis

- more than a cross-check in two pillar strategy in world with financial frictions and instability

## 2. Price and Financial stability are intertwined

- Can't be separated – even fiscal policy is connected (FTPL)

## 3. “Sectoral” impairment of monetary transmission mechanism

- SME are disadvantaged compared to sovereigns and large corporations
- Prudentially designed ABS
  - Chance to standardize and set-up a stable European intermediation market

# Overview

- Textbook monetary model vs. empirical finance view
- Why quantities in monetary analysis?
- Which quantities?                      in tranquil and turbulent times
  - Credit vs. money
  - Liquidity mismatch
    - Aggregate
    - Topography across sectors
- Sectoral impaired transmission mechanism
- ABS market for SME loans

Theoretical underpinning  
“The I Theory of Money”

# Textbook monetary model (New Keynesian)

- Key friction: price/wage rigidity  
financial markets (almost) perfect (stable)
- Advancement: dynamic modeling  
emphasis on expectations of “the” short-term interest  
(and its dynamic evolution e.g. Taylor rule)
- Term spread: Expectations hypothesis  
- expected future short rate
- Credit spread: expected default rates

*Cash flow news is  
the main driver*

# Finance view

- Key friction: financial frictions, segmentations

$$\Delta \text{price} = f(\Delta E[\text{future cash flows}], \Delta \text{risk premia})$$

small

large

- Term spread: expectations hypothesis fails
- Credit spread: default risk  
risk premium predicts future econ-activity
- VIX (VSTOXX)
- “I theory”
  - risk is endogenous &  
risk premium is time varying
  - MoPo recaps impaired sectors and affects risk and risk premium
  - Surprise Fed interest rate cut lowers 10 year (real) TIPS yield  
Hanson-Stein (2014)

*Risk premium news  
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
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Hanson-Stein (2014) - difficult to square with price stickiness alone

*Risk premium news  
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
# Why quantities?

- Arguments against, prices, rates, risk premia are enough
  - Only prices should affect individual decision makers' actions!
  - Why not model with “exogenous risk premium wedge”?
    - Wedges can predict future economic activity
  - (Shadow) prices measure scarcity/abundance of quantities



# Why quantities? – in tranquil times

- **Indicator of vulnerability** (to erratic shifts)
  - Not only mean prediction, but whole distribution
- **Trigger vs. Amplification**
  - Triggers: **varies** subprime, internet,
  - Amplification: **common** liquidity mismatch
- **Prices follow trend, but quantities show build-up of risk**
  - quantities
- **Multiplicity**





# Impaired transmission mechanism

■ “push on a string” or “trapped, constrained to push”


1. ZLB  $\Rightarrow$  unconventional MoPo
2. Threat of runs (e.g. jump in multiple equilibria)
  - Interest rate cut might be seen as weak signal
  - CB’s action might be viewed as coordination device
3. Threat to financial instability
  - “Financial dominance”
4. Monetary Transmission Mechanism works differently across sectors/regions
  - “Sectorally impaired”  $\leftarrow$  *later more*

# What quantities? Credit versus Money

- Old dispute


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


# 1. Shock impairs assets – 1<sup>st</sup> of 4 steps


- Absent MoPo



# 2. Shrink balance sheet: sell off assets




# 3. Liquidity spiral: price of assets drop



# 4. Deflation spiral: value of liability expand

1. Shock impairs asset ↓
2. Balance sheet shrink ↓
3. Asset price ↓
4. Real value of deposit ↑



Small shock has large effect and redistributes wealth

# What quantities? Money vs. Credit

## ■ Money view

Friedman-Schwartz

- Restore money supply
  - Replace missing inside money with outside money
- Aim: Switch off deflationary spiral
  - ... but banks might not extend credit (hold excess reserves)

## ■ Credit view

Tobin

- Restore credit flow
- Aim: Switch off deflationary spiral & liquidity spiral



# What quantities? – Vulnerability indicator

- What captures better endogenous risk?
  - Response indicator  $\Rightarrow$  amplification
- Monetary analysis = sectoral analysis (entire topography)

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A

L

## Technological liquidity

- Duration of project/reversibility

## Market liquidity

- Specificity/redeployability
- Can only sell assets at

**fire-sale prices**

Ease with which one can raise money by **selling** the asset

## Funding liquidity

- Can't **roll over** short term debt
- **Margin**-funding is recalled


Ease with which one can raise money by **borrowing** using the asset as collateral

**Liquidity**

**Maturity mismatch**


# Quantities in tranquil times

- Risk build-up phase “Volatility Paradox”
  - Liquidity mismatch increases during tranquil times




- Intermediation chain often hide overall liquidity mismatch
- Distribution matters: “Topography of Liquidity Mismatch”

# || Sectoral analysis




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


# Sectoral analysis: Run-ups of debt

## United States



## Japan



### ■ Different sectors

- Japan 1980s      non-financial business + financial sector
- US 2000s        household + financial sector

# Quantities in turbulent times

- I Theory: “Bottleneck approach”      sectorally impaired
- Identify bottleneck
  - Sectors: Banking vs. insurance, SMEs, corporate sector, household,...
- “Stealth” recapitalization of impaired sector
  - Interest policy and OMO affect asset prices
    - i-cut: increases value of long-term assets relative to short-term money
      - Steepens yield curve
    - QE increases value of particular asset
      - Flattens yield curve
  - Ex-post: Redistributes wealth/risk
  - Reduces endogenous risk (premium)– additional element to FTPL

# Recap strategies – two opposing alternatives

## 1. Recap through temporary **monopoly rents**

- + forbearance (to hide losses on legacy assets, “zombie problem”)
- Idea: Ex-post: recap ex-ante: insurance
- Competition is less fierce when balance sheets are impaired
  - Profit margins ↑
  - Volume ↓ ⇒ spillovers to others in GE (“spillbacks”)  
depends how crucial sector is, intern. competition  
abroad: Latin America in 1980s  
domestic: Japan 1990s


## 2. Attract **new risk-bearing capital**

- Attract foreign competition S-Korea late 1990s
- (Forced) equity issuance
- Establish new efficient markets
  - Profit margins ↓
  - Volume ↑ ⇒ new credit to real economy



# Prudent ABS market for SMEs

- New risk-bearing capital targeted at SME/consumers
- Current situation:
  - Sovereign rates stabilized at low levels
  - Corporate bonds rates also down
  - High demand for long-dated **liquid** assets
    - \$26 trillion global Pension savings (OECD data), s.t. regulatory hurdles
  - Private loans & SME credit




# Prudent ABS market for SMEs

- Convert **illiquid** SME/consumer loans → **liquid** asset class

- Short-run objective:

- Stimulate credit growth to SMEs
- “sectorally balanced” MoPo



- Long-run objective:

- Re-establish Euro-wide intermediation
  - ECB can set EU-wide standards (e.g. by co-investing in Mezzanine)
  - Small scale purchase might be sufficient to restart market
- Create collateral/safe asset (like ESBies)
- Reduce diabolic loop

- Design choice

No maturity transformation (ABS are long-dated assets)

- Otherwise: liquidity/run risk + adjust monetary analysis

# ||| To sum up - the 3 main points

## 1. Monetary analysis

- more than a cross-check in two pillar strategy in world with financial frictions and instability
- Quantities in tranquil time help to identify vulnerability
- Quantities in turbulent times help to identify “bottleneck”
- Topography of liquidity mismatch across sectors (not simply credit/money)

## 2. Price and Financial stability are intertwined

- Can't be separated

## 3. “Sectoral” impaired monetary transmission mechanism

- SME are disadvantaged compared to sovereigns and large corporations
- Prudentially designed ABS
  - Chance to re-establish European intermediation
  - Make illiquid loans into liquid standardized securities
  - Stay away from securitization that involves maturity transformation