

Money Illusion and Housing Frenzies



Markus K. Brunnermeier* and Christian Julliard \diamond

*Department of Economics
Princeton University

\diamond Department of Economics
London School of Economics

NYU Stern, March 8th, 2006

House prices in different countries



- dramatic boom-to-bust episodes, forecastable (Case-Shiller)
- Focus: Role of inflation

Mortgages, money illusion and house prices

Decision: Monthly **rent** versus monthly **mortgage payments**

⇒ *Example of money/inflation illusion*

- ⇒ decline in inflation ⇒ decline in nominal interest rate i
- ⇒ monthly payments decline
- ⇒ larger mortgage ⇒ higher house prices

BUT

- ⇒ future mortgage payments are larger in real terms (mortgage is not inflated away.)

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Outline

- 1 Money illusion - Related literature
- 2 U.K. evidence
 - Real versus nominal - A first-cut
 - Decomposing inflation effects
 - Financial frictions
- 3 Cross-country evidence
 - U.S. evidence
- 4 Conclusion

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Money illusion - Related literature

“An economic theorist can, of course, commit no greater crime than to assume money illusion.” Tobin (1972)

- **Money Illusion:**

Patinkin (1965), Leontief (1936), Fisher (1928)

“That shirt I sold you will cost me just as much to replace as I am charging you [...] But I have made a profit on that shirt because I bought it for less.”

- **Recent survey evidence:**

Shiller (1997a), (1997b)

- **Related Psychological Biases:**

Shafir, Diamond, Tversky (1997), Genesove-Mayer (2001), ...

- **Stock market:**

Modigliani-Cohn (1979), Asness (2000, 2003), Ritter-Warr (2002), Campbell-Vuolteenaho (2004), Cohen et al. (2005)

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Decomposing price movements

Stage 1: Focus on price-rent ratio (P_t/L_t)

- abstracts from movements of fundamentals that affect prices and rents symmetrically (demographics, land cost etc.)
- not perfect substitutes: pride of ownership, ...

Stage 2: Decompose price-rent ratio in

- expected return (incl. risk premium)
- expected rent growth rate
- “mispricing”

Inflation effect on each part

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A first cut

$$\text{PV of permanent service flow} = L + \frac{L}{1+r} + \frac{L}{(1+r)^2} + \dots$$

$$\frac{P_t}{L_t} = E_t \left[\sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+r_{\tau})^{\tau-t-1}} \right] \approx \frac{1}{r_t}$$

with money illusion

$$\frac{P_t}{L_t} = \tilde{E}_t \left[\sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+r_{\tau})^{\tau-t-1}} \right] \approx E_t \left[\sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{(1+i_{\tau})^{\tau-t-1}} \right] \approx \frac{1}{i_t}$$

- Regress P_t/L_t separately on $1/r_t$, $1/i_t$, and π_t .

A first cut

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Forecasting regressions

- Regress P_t/L_t separately on $1/r_t$, $1/i_t$, and π_t .
- Persistence of P_t/L_t and regressors might lead to spurious results.
- Regress forecasts error on $1/r$, $1/i$, and π .

$$\hat{\delta}_{t+1,t+1-s} = \begin{cases} P_{t+1}/L_{t+1} & \text{for } s = 0 \\ P_{t+1}/L_{t+1} - \hat{E}_{t-s}[P_{t+1}/L_{t+1}] & \text{for } s > 0 \end{cases}$$

where $\hat{E}_{t-s}[P_t/L_t]$ reduced form VAR for P_t/L_t , log gross return, $r_{h,t}$, the rent growth rate Δl_t and the log real interest rate, r_t .

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



Figure 3: t -statistics and R^2 of univariate regressions of the forecast error $\hat{\delta}_{t+1,t+1-\tau}$ on interest rates and interest rate reciprocals (both nominal and real) as well as inflation.

Price-rent ratio and TIPS implied real interest rates



(standardized series)

Inflation and predictable component

- Case-Shiller (1989) house price *changes* are predictable
⇒ inefficiency?
- What explains variation of changes in price-rent ratio?
 - lagged inflation and nominal interest rates explains 6 to 10 percent
(significant regressors, consistent with money illusion)
 - real interest rate has no predictive power
- Is inflation in pricing kernel/rent growth predictions for other reasons?
(risk-premium, growth prediction, frictions)

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Decomposing inflation effects

$$R_{h,t+1} = \frac{P_{t+1} + L_{t+1}}{P_t}$$

- Log-linearize around steady state and iterate

$$p_t - l_t = \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \left[\sum_{\tau=1}^{T-1} \rho^{\tau-1} (\Delta l_{t+\tau} - r_{h,t+\tau}) + \rho^T (p_{t+T} - l_{t+T}) \right].$$

- Note if p_t is distorted, then so are all realized $r_{h,t+\tau}$
- Subtract r^f to obtain excess Δl^e and excess returns r^e
- Take expectations: E (objective), \tilde{E} (subjective)

Construction of ψ -Mispricing

- Taking expectations and assuming that TVCs hold

$$\begin{aligned}
 p_t - I_t &= \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} E_t [\Delta I_{t+\tau}^e] - \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} E_t [r_{h,t+\tau}^e] && \text{rational traders} \\
 &= \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} \tilde{E}_t [\Delta I_{t+\tau}^e] - \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} \tilde{E}_t [r_{h,t+\tau}^e] && \text{irrational traders}
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ψ_t -Mispricing measure

$$\psi_t := \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} (\tilde{E}_t - E_t) [\Delta I_{t+\tau}^e]$$

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- Problem: How to construct a proxy for $\tilde{E}_t [r_{h,t+\tau}^e]$
 \Rightarrow use linear subjective risk factor λ_t
 What is the correct risk factor λ_t ?

- 1 GARCH-estimate of cond. volatility of long housing short r^f
- 2 Housing is like inflation-linked bond, but
 - probability of moving
(migration, job creation/destruction data)
 - cross-sectional variation of house prices

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- Problem: How to construct a proxy for $\tilde{E}_t [r_{h,t+\tau}^e]$
 - Model $\tilde{E}_t [r_{h,t+\tau}^e]$ as (and run OLS):

$$\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} E_t [r_{h,t+\tau}^e] = \underbrace{\alpha + \beta \lambda_t + \xi_t}_{=:\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} \tilde{E}_t [r_{h,t+\tau}^e]} + \psi_t$$

- \Rightarrow obtain estimate for coefficients and $\hat{\psi}_t$.
- Empirical strategy:
 - 1 Obtain $\hat{E} [\Delta l_{t+\tau}^e]$ from VAR and $\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} E_t [r_{h,t+\tau}^e]$
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
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The different measures of mispricing

- ψ -mispricing measure depends on added controls for ξ .
 - 1 ψ with controls (quarterly dummies, VAR(1)-forecast)
 - 2 ψ' without controls



ε -Mispricing

ε_t -Mispricing measure (very conservative)


$$\varepsilon_t := \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} \left(\tilde{E}_t - E_t \right) \left[\Delta l_{t+\tau}^e - r_{h,t+\tau}^e \right] + \tilde{E}_t \left[\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \rho^T (p_{t+T} - l_{t+T}) \right]$$

$$p_t - l_t = \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} E_t \left[\Delta l_{t+\tau}^e - r_{h,t+\tau}^e \right] + \underbrace{E_t \left[\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \rho^T (p_{t+T} - l_{t+T}) \right]}_{=:\varepsilon_t}$$

- violation of the TVC under the objective measure

ε -Mispricing

- ε -Mispricing measure ($H_1 : \varepsilon = 0$)
 - non-neglectable
 - martingale property cannot be rejected
 - analysis holds in first differences



Empirical evidence

Dependent Variables:	π_t		i_t		$\log(1/i_t)$	
	coeff.	R^2	coeff.	R^2	coeff.	R^2
Panel A						
$\hat{\psi}_t$	-4.09 (13.479)	.83	-6.80 (11.765)	.74	.136 (8.020)	.69
$\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} \hat{E}_t \Delta l_{t+\tau}^e$	-2.58 (2.390)	.12	-3.96 (1.938)	.09	.093 (2.083)	.12
$-\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} \tilde{E}_t r_{h,t+\tau}^e$	1.92 (1.066)	.03	3.581 (1.050)	.03	-.050 (.595)	.02
Panel B						
$\hat{\psi}'_t$	-6.15 (2.48)	.17	-10.85 (2.66)	.17	.241 (2.82)	.19
$\hat{\varepsilon}_t$	-3.90 (7.946)	.65	-6.3 (6.927)	.55	.129 (5.991)	.52

Table 1: Univariate Regressions, Newey-West (1987) corrected t -statistics in brackets.

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	coeff.	R^2	coeff.	R^2	coeff.	R^2
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$\hat{\psi}_t$	-4.09 (13.479)	.83	-6.80 (11.765)	.74	.136 (8.020)	.69
$\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} \hat{E}_t \Delta l_{t+\tau}^e$	-2.58 (2.390)	.12	-3.96 (1.938)	.09	.093 (2.083)	.12
$-\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} \tilde{E}_t r_{h,t+\tau}^e$	1.92 (1.066)	.03	3.581 (1.050)	.03	-.050 (.595)	.02
Panel B						
$\hat{\psi}'_t$	-6.15 (2.48)	.17	-10.85 (2.66)	.17	.241 (2.82)	.19
$\hat{\varepsilon}_t$	-3.90 (7.946)	.65	-6.3 (6.927)	.55	.129 (5.991)	.52

Table 1: Univariate Regressions, Newey-West (1987) corrected t -statistics in brackets.

Empirical evidence

Dependent Variables:	π_t		i_t		$\log(1/i_t)$	
	coeff.	R^2	coeff.	R^2	coeff.	R^2
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Robustness analysis - Methodology

Posterior of estimated VAR (under diffuse prior, sample size n and m parameters)

$$\beta | \Sigma \sim N \left(\hat{\beta}, \Sigma \otimes (X'X)^{-1} \right)$$

$$\Sigma^{-1} \sim \text{Wishart} \left(\left(n \hat{\Sigma} \right)^{-1}, n - m \right)$$

- 1 Draw covar-matrices $\hat{\Sigma}$ from inverse Wishart with $\hat{\Sigma}$, n and m
- 2 Cond. on $\hat{\Sigma}$ draw VAR-coefficients $\hat{\beta} \sim N \left(\hat{\beta}, \hat{\Sigma} \otimes (X'X)^{-1} \right)$
- 3 Use $\hat{\beta}$ to construct $\sum_{\tau} \rho^{\tau-1} \dot{E}_t \Delta l_{t+\tau}^e$, $\sum_{\tau} \rho_t^{\tau-1} \dot{E}_t r_{h,t+\tau}^e$, and $\dot{\psi}_t$
- 4 Regress $\dot{\psi}_t$, $\sum_{\tau} \rho^{\tau-1} \dot{E}_t \Delta l_{t+\tau}^e$, $\sum_{\tau} \rho_t^{\tau-1} \dot{E}_t r_{h,t+\tau}^e$ on π_t , i_t , $1/i_t$
- 5 Iterate and compute confidence intervals for OLS coefficients and R^2 from their percentiles

Robustness analysis - Results

DepVar:	Regressors:					
	π_t		i_t		$\log(1/i_t)$	
	coeff.	R^2	coeff.	R^2	coeff.	R^2
Panel A						
$\hat{\psi}_t$	-3.10 [-7.79, -.19]	.61 [.03, .92]	-5.28 [-12.63, -.25]	.57 [.04, .78]	.107 [.01, .25]	.54 [.04, .71]
Δl -terms	-2.6 [-11.8, 9.08]	.27 [0, .85]	-4.01 [-18.1, 13.9]	.20 [0, .64]	.095 [-.303, .392]	.21 [0, .58]
$-r$ -terms	1.81 [-10.41, 9.61]	.10 [0, .64]	3.44 [-15.34, 15.43]	.09 [0, .59]	-.048 [-.328, .286]	.07 [0, .44]
Panel B						
$\hat{\varepsilon}_t$	-3.9 [-11.1, -.19]	.64 [.05, .94]	-6.28 [-17.4, -.68]	.54 [.05, .75]	.129 [.01, .372]	.52 [.05, .67]

Table 2: Median and 95 percent confidence intervals for slope coefficients and R^2 .

Robustness analysis - Results


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Tilt effect of inflation

- inflation *tilts* real mortgage repayment scheme



- can't afford initial mortgage payments Lessard-Modigliani + Tucker (1975)
- BUT more flexible mortgage schemes
 - Price level adjusted mortgage (PLAM)
 - Graduate payment mortgage (GPM)
 - Interest only mortgages

are available since 1970's in UK and mortgages became more flexible over the years

PREDICTION OF TILT EFFECT:

- inflation effect less negative over time

Tilt effect - Inflation effect over time




Figure 6: Point estimates and 95 percent Newey and West (1987) corrected confidence bounds of slope coefficients as sample size increases.

- tilt effect is unlikely to explain inflation effect.

Lock-in effect

- locked in low fixed nominal rate on existing mortgage
 \Rightarrow reluctant to buy better house if mortgage is not portable

PREDICTION OF LOCK-IN EFFECT

- for the full sample estimates

$$\psi_t = \hat{a} + \hat{b}_1 d_t i_t + \hat{b}_2 (1 - d_t) i_t + \hat{e}_t \Rightarrow \hat{b}_1 \neq \hat{b}_2$$

where d_t is an indicator function of upward movements in i_t

- for rolling samples estimates:
 - $\text{Corr}[R^2, d_t] \neq 0$
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
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Mispricing measures and the business cycle

- During booms (busts) high quality houses appreciate (de-) more than smaller houses
 - house prices reflect all types of dwellings
 - rent index tends to overweigh lower quality dwellings
- \Rightarrow Price-rent ratio might move over business cycle
- Control for business cycle proxy
 - \hat{c}_t Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter



Mispricing measures and the business cycle

Row:	DepVar:	Regressors:				R^2
		\hat{c}_t	π_t	i_t	$\log(1/i)$	
(1)	$\hat{\psi}_t$	0.81 (1.959)				.07
(2)		0.32 (2.135)	-4.00 (13.761)			.85
(3)		0.378 (2.168)		-6.64 (11.137)		.76
(5)	$\hat{\psi}'_t$	1.11 (0.963)				.01
(6)		0.36 (0.349)	-5.98 (2.279)			.17
(7)		0.41 (0.369)		-10.5 (2.436)		.17
(9)	$\hat{\varepsilon}_t$	0.85 (2.201)				.07
(10)		0.41 (2.281)	-3.80 (7.801)			.67
(11)		0.49		-6.10		.57

- 1 Money illusion - Related literature
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U.S. Decomposition of inflation effects

Dependent Variables:	π_t		Regressors:		$\log(1/i_t)$	
	coeff.	R^2	coeff.	R^2	coeff.	R^2
Panel A						
$\hat{\psi}_t$	-6.65 (4.525)	.45	-6.30 (3.182)	.28	.141 (4.256)	.35
$\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} \hat{E}_t \Delta l_{t+\tau}^e$	-2.87 (6.572)	.65	-3.46 (6.170)	.65	.066 (4.693)	.60
$-\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \rho^{\tau-1} \tilde{E}_t r_{h,t+\tau}^e$.76 (.211)	.01	4.65 (1.130)	.05	-.066 (.734)	.03
Panel B						
$\hat{\epsilon}_t$	-10.2 (5.148)	.48	-6.86 (2.648)	.15	.159 (3.238)	.21

Table 3: Univariate Regressions, Newey-West (1987) corrected t -statistics in brackets.

U.S. Robustness analysis

	DepVar:		Regressors:			
	π_t		i_t		$\log(1/i_t)$	
	coeff.	R^2	coeff.	R^2	coeff.	R^2
Panel A						
$\hat{\psi}_t$	-6.06 [-7.32, -2.76]	.44 [.06, .66]	-5.84 [-7.12, -2.14]	.27 [.03, .66]	.130 [.070, .155]	.35 [.06, .60]
Δl -terms	-2.86 [-8.17, 1.53]	.59 [.01, .96]	-3.45 [-7.27, -0.53]	.52 [.02, .71]	.066 [.003, .149]	.51 [.01, .70]
$-r$ -terms	.44 [-4.84, 3.21]	.01 [0, .09]	4.23 [1.12, 5.82]	.04 [.01, .12]	-.023 [-.097, 0]	.07 [0, .15]
Panel B						
$\hat{\varepsilon}_t$	-10.2 [-16.2, -7.25]	.48 [.36, .62]	-6.83 [-10, -4.79]	.15 [.11, .21]	.159 [.115, .25]	.21 [.16, .26]

Table 4: Median and 95 percent confidence intervals for slope coefficients and R^2 .

Conclusion

- Money Illusion arises if e.g. investors simply compare current rent with current mortgage payment
- Inflation affects house prices
- Rational channels alone do not explain inflation effects
 - Low inflation leads to higher *expected rent growth*
 - Inflation impact on *expected housing returns* is insignificant
 - Inflation explains substantial part of “*mispricing*”
- Frictions are unlikely to fully rationalize the empirical findings
 - *Tilt effect* should decline as mortgages became more flexible
 - *Lock-in effect* does not arise — mortgages are portable in UK
- ⇒ Evidence in favor of money illusion
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First difference estimation

	Slope coeff.	R^2
U.K	-4.022 (7.459)	.31
U.S.	-3.629 (6.588)	.35
Australia	-26.21 (25.82)	.85

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
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