MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION: OPTIMIZING A CURRENCY AREA MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER

Colloquium in Honor of Lucas D. Papademos

Based on "Report: Monitoring the ECB" with C. Goodhart, P-O. Gourinchas and R. Repullo

Two Challenges

1. Financial Stability


- Build up of risk during bubble phase
- Materializes in crisis

Two Challenges

1. Financial Stability

- Build up of risk during bubble phase
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2. Price Stability Dispersion



Overview

- 1. Redefine second pillar = financial stability pillar
 - Lean against credit bubbles
 - Redefine monetary and credit aggregates
- 2. Make currency area optimal
 - More than one instrument -- regional

Current Rationale of Second Pillar

- Monetary analysis
 - Focus on money aggregates/supply
 - Long-run/medium term view
 - Note: strictly speaking introduces a second objective
 - Short-term (Pillar 1)
 - Medium/long-term (Pillar 2)
 - Cross checking

How to weigh them?

Quantity theory of money

 $M_t V_t = P_t X_t$

Prediction (after high money growth):
 High inflation in the very long run

New Rationale for Second Pillar

- Financial stability
 - Lean against (credit) bubbles
 - High credit growth (partially reflected in M₃)
- Prediction (after high credit growth):
 - Financial crisis impairs monetary transmission mechanism
 - Crisis binds hands
 - one is driven by events and hence not in control
 - High de-/inflation volatility
 - Deflationary pressure
 - Inflation due to monetization after bailouts

Note difference to Quantity theory!

Arguments for "Benign Neglect Policy"

- 1. Difficult to identify bubble
 - Any policy is a decision under uncertainty
 - Risk management approach
- 2. Lean versus clean
 - Symmetric treatment
 - Asset bubble vs. credit bubble
- 3. Interest rate is not most effective tool to prick bubbles
 - Effective when combined with "open mouth policy"
 - in early phase +
 - when term spreads are thin and bubble driven by yield curve carry trade
- 4. Too crude not surgical
 - Bubbles affect large part of economy
 - Use in conjunction with other instruments
- 5. Pricking bubble led to disastrous outcomes (US 1928, Japan 1989)

Financial versus Monetary Stability

- When is there a trade-off?
 - Times of "great moderation":
 - Inflation is (seems to be) contained
 - Credit and asset price expansion "credit bubble"
 - Build-up of risk, which will only materialize later
 - After burst,
 - deflationary pressure
 - monetary transmission mechanism can be impaired
 - bailouts + government deficits (potentially leading to long-run inflation?)
 - Should interest rate be increased
 - Price stability (inflation targeting)
 No
 - Financial stability
- New rationale

modified monetary aggregates

Yes

Quantitative Aggregates

Credit aggregates


- Credit (growth) aggregates
- Credit lines
 - Excessive draws on credit lines are signs of upcoming troubles
 - Newly extended credit lines
- Shortening of maturity structure
- Repo growth
- + asset bubbles + "bubble anecdotes"
- Features
 - Maturity structure
 - Counterparties (levered banks vs. households)
- Money aggregates (related)
 - Portfolio shifts to shorter maturity, safer assets

Soundness of balance sheets

The Second Challenges

- 1. Financial Stability
 - Build up of risk during bubble phase
 - Materializes in crisis






Optimal Currency Area - reconsidered

Currency union

- Loss of instrument: same interest rate in whole area (+ "loss of a valve", since exchange rate is fixed)
- Traditional view: optimal currency area if
 - No large asymmetry in shocks
 - Fiscal integration
 - Labor mobility
- Hence, Euro area is not an optimal currency area
- How can the ECB make it an optimal currency area? (transfer union is politically not feasible)

The Insight

Same short-term interest rate
 ... but what counts for economy is 'risky long-term rate'



Affected by haircut policy + macroprudential regulation


The Idea

• Use regional ...

- Collateral policy (haircuts)
 - E.g. haircuts for mortgages in country X (with housing boom) are higher
- Haircut/margin regulation (analog to US-Regulation T)
- (Purchase regional assets)
- Macroprudential regulation (through ESRB)

as an active policy instrument

Too lean against regional bubbles/imbalances



 Details to be worked out in Brunnermeier-Gourinchas (2010) "Monetary Policy is a Non-Optimal Currency Area"

How Can ECB-ESRC Affect Macroprudential Regulation?

- Adjust Maastricht criteria
 - Ireland satisfied the Maastricht criteria, but ...
 - private debt is subject to "bailout risk" for government
- Define 'expected' public debt
 - Public debt + Prob(bailout) * bank debt
 - Prob(bailout) = f(quality of bank regulation)
- Advantage: ESRB gets some teeth control, how member states conduct bank regulation

Conclusion

- 1. Financial Stability = second pillar
 - Modify monetary/credit aggregates
- 2. Optimize currency area
 - Using haircuts/macroprudential regulation as active policy instruments (to distort)